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Key Questions about the standard view
















































The standardview explains the US external deficit as the result
of a budget deficit that operated through a real appreciation,
effected by a nominal exchange rate change. Challenges to this view
question one or more of the links this process. Thus the debate
over the international adjustment process is really three debates,
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as Some supply—side defenders of the US tax cuts of 1981, such








Roberts (1987), argue that it is the
result, not of the fiscal deficit, but of excess ight monetary
policy. This argument can actually be rationaliz in a perfectly
standard demand—side macroeconomic view2. In the rd Mundell—
Fleming model with high capital mobility and sti ces, a monetary
contraction will lead to a real appreciation and e deficit. The
savings—investment identity will hold because th in net exports
produces a contraction of national income, leadi fall in both
government revenues and private income; hence both private and
government savings fall.
Many economists would agree that this is a good story for the
early stages of the rising dollar and the emerging external imbalances
in 1981 and 1982. However, it is a difficult story to maintain for the
persisting imbalances of 1984 and after. The reason is that an
unavoidable side implication of the story is that the country
experiencing a monetary contraction must also be experiencing a
decline in output ——ifnot in absolute terms, at least relative to
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Significance of the critique
The view that monetary policy was responsible for the US external
cit in the mid-1980s can be rejected as inconsistent with the
c facts. However, this does not demonstrate that fiscal policy did
There is an important debate over the relationship between the
—15—











































DO REAL EXCHANGE RATES HAVETO CHANGE?
We next turn to the key issue of the current debate over the
process of international adjustment: the role of real exchange rates
in the adjustment process. In the standard view, fiscal imbalances
work through the real exchange rate: a budget deficit leads to a real
appreciation, which reduces the competitiveness of a country's
industry and thus leads to a trade deficit. US critics of the
conventional wisdom, however, have argued that no real exchange rate
change is necessary, that a shift in savings rates can change the
trade balance at constant relative prices. European and lapanese
—16—
budget deficit and savings and an equally important debate over
whether savings rates normally spill over into trade balances. Thus it
is important to acknowledge the uncertainites over these links1 which
have become closely identified with the standard view about the
sources of and cure for current account imbalances. However, it is
important to notice that critiques of the fiscal—external linkage have
no bearing on the puzzling trade developments since 1985. The point is
that the US fiscal deficit has not changed much since 1985, nor has
theUS natonulsavings rate. The puzzle is how it was possible, given
the lack of change in these factors, for the dollar to move so much ——
andhow it was possible for the dollar to decline so much without much—17—
often go further, seeming to argue that deficit
an alternative to real depreciation, and that the
to fall in order to keep the dollar from declining
in a recent article Wakasugi (1987) writes that
The fundamental causes of the dollars depreciation are the U.S.
budget deficit and an unfavorable balance of payments which shows no
sign of improving. Only the 11.9. itself can recover the dollars
status as an international key currency. Therefore, in the longrun,










The fact that the US advocates of the view that real depreciation
is unecessary are more or less monetarist in their views on
macroeconomic policy, and that their skepticism of the need for real
depreciation is tied to a denial of real effects of nominal
depreciation, makes it seem to casual observers that this dispute is
yet another monetarist—Keynesian argument that hinges on the issue of
price flexibility. Eowever, this is a misperception. This is a replay
of an old debate, but it is Keynes versus Ohlin, not Tobin versus
Friedman; it is the old question of the relative price effects of an
international transfer of resources.
see the nature of the issue, it is useful to consider a
rudimentary model that reveals the conditions under which a real
depreciation is or is not necessary as part of current account
adjustment. (A more formal treatment of thi; mode) is given in
appendix 4). We can then examine the empirical evidence that bears on
the question.—18—
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on expenditure. A shift in
raises foreign expenditure, and that isall;there is no direct way in
which it makes US goods more competitive. The issue, then, is whether
it is possible to reduce US expenditure and raise foreign expenditure,
while keeping the relative price of the US and the foreign good
constant.
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Ifsurplus countries have mx
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5.7 percent increase in output. To
account deficit of $140 billion at
require an even larger output incre
if any countries believe that they
and it is hard to believe that the
would be willing to risk a demand—I
than, say, two percent. This means
countries to risk faster growth can
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doing this are in practice. The
the US is approximately $8 trillion
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eliminate the whole 1986 US current
constant relative prices would
ase, approximately 8 percent. Few
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ed expansion of output of more
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could turn out to be correct all the same can be decisively rejected—27-
empirically. If surplus countries have excess capacity, a willingness
on their part to grow faster can substitute for real exchange rate
adjustment, but in practice only liaited help can be expected from
this Source.
There remains3 of course, the puzzle of why the real exchange
rate changes since 1985 have thus far produced such modest results.
What this discussion shows is that the trade puzzle cannot be resolved
by arguing that the savings—investment balance somehow directly
determines the trade balance, without a role for the real exchange
rate, There is a real puzzle, but its resolution must be sought in the
behavior of markets for goods and services, not in the fact of capital
market linkages.
Adjusting external deficits, then, requires real exchange rate
adjustment. The remaining question is whether nominal exchange rate
changes have a valuable role to play in this process.
THE ROLE OF NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT
While the key analytical debate about the international
adjustment mechanism is probably about the role of the real exchange
rate, the immediate policy concern is with nominal exchange rates——
whether the dollar should be encouraged or at least allowed to decline
further, while the yen rises higher. The idea of promoting exchange
rate movements in pursuit of external balance has come in for— S
extremelychirp criticism from advocates of a return to some form of
fixed rate;. For example, Plundell' writes that
The claim that (favorable consequences] will follow from depreciation
is sheer quackery. It is closer to the truth to say that apolicyof
appreciating the yen and the European currencies relative to the
dollar will cause deflation abroad, inflation at home, a larger dollar
deficit, and vast equity sales to foreign investors. Ownership of
factories, technology, and real assets will be exported to finance an
even larger trade deficit without there being much, if any real
expansion in exports or reduction in the dollar value of imports. US
assets will be sold abroad at bargain—basement prices. If the American
dog get; fed better, it will be by eating its own tail.
the di
The facilitatinQ role of exchange rate changes
of
Suppose that the world economy started from a
equilibrium, and that a sudden depreciation of the
engir.eered. Nearly all economists would agree that
effect of this depreciation would be some combinat
the US and deflation abroad, with the original rea
position of
dollar were somehow
in the long run the
ion of inflation in
1 exchange rate
s this negative assessment at all Justified? To rake sense of
spute, we need to consider two issues. First is the question
whether nominal exchange rate movements are intended to produce real
exchange rate changes that would not have happened otherwise, or to
facilitate real exchange rate changes driven by other forces. Second
is the q..estion of whether it is indeed easier to adjust relative
prices via exchange rate changes than via inflation and deflation,—29—
being eventually restored, and no long run effect on external
balances, To the extent that prices and wages adjust slowly, there
would be a temporary period of higher US output and a larger US trade
surplus, but few would view this transitory effect as worth seeking
through an exogenous depreciation.
Suppose, however, that the world economy does no start from a
position of equilibrium. In particular, suppose that an adjustment of
US and rest—of—world fiscal policy requires a real US depreciation
against the rest of the world. Then the situation is very different.
If the dollar does not depreciate, there will have to be some mix of
deflation in the US and inflation abroad. To the extent that prices
are slow to adjust, this need to change internal price levels will
lead both to a delay in the adjustment of external imbalances and a
period of unemployment in the US. An exchange rate adjustment can
facilitate the process of adjustment by eliminating this need for
changes in internal price levels.
The critics of dollar depreciation, such as Mundell, have
portrayed the situation as being our first case, where exchange rate
changes are simply imposed on an equilibrium situation. This view in
turn goes back to the argument that current account adjustment does
not require any real exchange rate changes. However, we have seen that
this argurnent is fallacious. There is no reasonable quarrel with the
view that narroxing current account divergences does require a fall in
the relative prices of goods produced in deficit countries. A
depreciation of the dollar and appreciation of the currencies oftempt to conjure
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economy,
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byloweringall domestic wages relative to
time. Figure 1shows thebehavior ofUS uni
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investment balance somehow gets translated into
without affecting the real exchange rate. A for
savings to adeficitcountry must be associated
relative price of that countrys goods and serv
whether the claim is actually being made that n
leads to real appreciation. In any case, the a
this, since the depreciation of the dollar an
have, as Figure 1 showed, been associated wit
real exchange rate changes in the same direct
1. Reducing external imbalances reguires real depreciation by deficit
countries, real appreciation by surplus countries. The only exception
is where there is large excess capacity in the surplus countries, and
this caveat is of only modest importance in the current situation. The
widespread belief that integrated world capital markets somehow bypass




there are too many econ
Nonetheless, it is true
case, it seems hard to
on changing currency vi
achieve the real exchan
external imbalances.
3. Fiscal imbalances contributed to the widening of external
imbaiances in the 1BOs, and fiscal policy can contribute to narrowing
these irnbalances. As we saw, there are somereasonablegrounds for
skepticism about the standard view that the US deficit is the root of
the whole international imbalance. However, focussing on the 115 budget
de4icit remains the best game in town, and it is likely that fiscal
correction would make a significant contribution to narrowing current
account imbalances.
Implications for policy
The purpose of this paper isprimarilyto discuss how the
international adjustment mechanism works, rather than prescribe
policy. However, it is important to discuss at least briefly the
—35—
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on fiscal policy in the United States and elsewhere poses a problem.
There is a reasonable case that, given the long lags in the effects of
exchange rates on trade, exchange rate adjustment should precede
fiscal change. If fiscal action is still 6 years away, however, one
would not want to anticipate it with exchange rate adjustment now.
Does this mean that nothing can be said about policy? On the
contrary, on the basis of what we do know about the international
adjustment mechanism one quite clear piece of advice can be given: fl
canbecost lvto lock nationsinpotentially_unsustainable eychang
cates.It is highly likely that when fiscal policy finally is fixed,
further real depreciation by the US and further real appreciation by
the surplus countries will be required. If polcymakers nonetheless
decide that nominal rates should be stabilized at current levels, they
should not do so on the basis of a misguided belief that fiscal policy
somehow fixes trade imbalances without real exchange rate changes.Table 1: SavinQs, Investment, arid The External Balance
1979 1985
Xo GNP:
Gross investment 18.2 16.5
Grossprivate saving 17.8 17.2
Government saving 0.5 —3.4
Net foreign investment 0.1 —2.9
Real exchange rates 98.9 142.8
Real interest rate2 —1.3 3.6
1IMF index of normalized relative unit labor costs
2Treasury Bill rate less previous years CPI increase
Source: Economic Reportofthe President, 1987 and IMF International



































bill rate less previousyear's inflation
Source: Sur
Statistics











111 4.2Table 3: Estimates o m and mlimpliedby some recent studies
Study Implied m Implied me Sum
Krugman—Baldwin .33 .12 .45
DRI .14 .05 .19
NIESR .19 .05 .23
OECD .23 .05 .28
EPA .24 .11 .35
MCM .28 .11 .39
Taylor .33 .11 .44
Marris .24 .11 .35
Source: See Appendix 8Table 4: Derivation of m and m*





Krugman—Baldwin 2.9 .33 2.4 .12
DRI 1.2 .14 1.0 .05
NIESR 1.6 .19 1.0 .05
DECO 2.0 .23 1.0 .05
Output—based
estimates
EPA (Japan) 1.8 .24 1.2 .11
MCM (Federal 2.1 .28 2.1 .11
Reserve Board)
Taylor 2.5 .33 1.3 .11
I'arris 1.8 .24 1.5 .11










5. In a standard Mundell—Fleming model this differential growth with a
constant exchange rate could be accomplished through a monetary—fiscal
n's expositionwasthe one that broughtthelink between
tradedeficitstopublicattention, butthisthesiswas
by manypeople,sothat noone individualcanclaimsole
2. Which is no doubt why other supply—siders have
views as dangerous and demand—side in origin.
suffer a decline in demand for their policy ideas
Journal, August 18, 1987.
3. One possible way to expand the role of money i
tight US money of 1980—2 generated a speculative
permanently strong dollar that the subsequent mon
failed to dispel. Although this is a pretty much
hypothesis, I have some sympathy with it, since
why the dollar rose to levels that were higher
rates could justify (Krugman 1985a) and why so
national saving was financed by capital inflows.
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See in particular Mann (1987).REFERENCES
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Ja_pj, July 1987, p.3.APPENDIX A: THE TRADE BALANCE AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
In the text the conditions under which a redistribution of world
(1) pa +a'=py+y*
or a' =yl+p (y—a)
expenditure requires a change in the real exchange rate were explained
verbally and through a numerical example. This appendix briefly
presents an algebraic model, first presented in Kru;man and Baldwin
(1987), that makes the same point in a more rigorous way.
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, US and ROW.
Each country will be assumed to produce a single good that is both
consumed domestically and exported. We let ROWs output be numeraire,
and define p as the relative price of the US good. Initially let us
assume full employment, so that the US produces a fixed output y and
ROW produces a fixed output y*. We also leave the detereination of
expenditure in the two countries in the background, simply treating US
expenditure in terms of its own good as a parameter, a. For the world
as a whole income must equal expenditure. Thus if a* is ROW
expenditure, rresuredinterms of the ROW good, it must be true that
Now it is certainly true as an accounting identity that the trade
balance is equal to the excess of Income over expenditure, so that the
US trade balance, in terms of the US good, is simply(2) t 'y—a,
I.. S
an expression in whch therelativeprice of US goods does not
(3) py (1—m)pa + m*a'












This does no allow us to forget about relative prices.
There isstill a that the market for US output clear (in
which case the ea output clears as well, by Wairas's Law).
Each country will expenditure among the two goods. For
simplicity, let u Cobb—Douglas assumption that expenditure
shares are fi..ed, S spending a share rn of its income on
imports and 1—rn on output, ROW spending me on imports and 1—
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The implications of thi; small model are illustrated in Figure
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identical between the countries, so that (1—rn)m*. In either case,deficit to faI
From (4), an in




the effect is to make UU horizontal (Figure 3), so thata reduction In
US e%penditure need not be accompanied by a decline in the relative
price of what the US produces.
It is also possible for the trade
depreciation if foreign output expands.
foreign Output y* will shift ULiup,so t
capacity in ROW it is possible to have a








4:'.APPENDIX B: DERIVING ESTIMATES OF P1 AND N'
dM redEor, multiplying and
(N/El (dM/M)/(dE/E>
dividing,
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e. Let N denote total imports, E and
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At the same time,
out E and rearranging,
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we eventually arrive at the formula
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re e =(dM/M)/CCY/Y),the elasticity of imports with respect to
income from eight recentstudies. Six of the
aBrookings Workshop ontheUS current
1987 (Brookings 1987)jInaddition the
Baldwin (1987) and Marris(t9B) are
convert elasticities into marginal propensities to import,
of E and V for 1984 were taken for all market economies from
idBankWorld DevelopmentReport of 1986.Values of H and Mmand exports of goods and services from
President. These were then used1
ities, to construct the table. For
9871 estimates a US expenditure
2.9; since the share of imports in US
this yields amarginalpropensity to
B—3
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the 1987 Economic Report of the
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